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DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND
TRANSACTION COST ENGINEERING
Charles R. T. G'Kelley*
For teachers of the introductory Corporations' course, two
important themes are unavoidable-the dominant role of Delaware
corporate law in the governance of publicly traded American
corporations,2 and the task of turning law students into value-
adding professionals.3 It is surprising, then, that the great majority
of introductory Corporations courses currently offered in American
law schools do not use or emphasize the Delaware Corporation
* Kilpatrick Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D., University of Texas, 1972;
LL.M., Harvard University, 1977.
' The first course in the business law curriculum at most American law schools is
entitled Corporationg, Business Associations, or Business Organizations. The exact coverage
of these courses differs dramatically from school to school. Some courses focus substantial
attention on unincorporated business associations, while others devote little or no attention
to them. Some focus significant attention on federal securities law, while others give scant
or no attention to that topic. Because a central focus of almost all of these courses is the
corporation and the state statutory and judicial rules that comprise corporation law, I herein
use the term "Corporations" to refer to all such introductory courses. For survey data
concerning the content and structure of the introductory Corporations course, see Robert B.
Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study of Methods and
Content, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 438 (1998) (explaining results of survey taken on Corporations
courses).
2 The importance of Delaware law to the teaching of, and scholarship about, corporate
law is reflected in the predominant focus on Delaware judicial decisions and institutions that
characterize many cf the essays in this Symposium on Business Law Education. E.g.,
William W. Bratton, Delaware Law as Applied Public Choice Theory: Bill Cary and the Basic
Course After Twenty-five Years, 34 GA. L. REV. 447 (2000); Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate
Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, 34 GA. L. REV. 745 (2000); Lawrence A.
Hamermesh, Why IDo Not Teach Van Gorkom, 34 GA. L. REV. 477 (2000); Faith StevelIman
Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law's Relevance
to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505 (2000); Ed Rock & Michael Wachter, Corporate
Law as a Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529 (2000).
' Again, the focus on skills-building and professionalism is evident in the Conference on
Teaching Corporate Law panel on that subject, and the resulting essays in this Symposium.
E.g., James A. Fanto, When Those Who Do Teach, The Consequences of Law Firm Education
for Business Law Education, 34 GA. L. REV. 839 (2000); Carol R. Goforth, Use of Simulations
and Client-Based Exercises in the Basic Course, 34 GA. L. REV. 851 (2000); Therese Maynard,
Teaching Professionalism: The Lawyer as a Professional, 34 GA. L. REV. 895 (2000); Richard
W. Painter, Professional Responsibility Rules as Implied Contract Terms, 34 GA. L. REV. 953
(2000).
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Code,4 and that only one casebook5 appears to present Delaware
corporation law as a coherent system, as opposed to intermingling
Delaware cases and statutory references into a mosaic that presents
state corporate law as simply a series of interesting, cross-jurisdic-
tional, common-law, and statutory solutions or approaches to the
central problems facing incorporated firms and their equity owners.6
Likewise, it is surprising that, while the vast majority of Corpora-
tions teachers place at least some emphasis on teaching lawyering
skills and relevant theories, there is no indication that such
teachers self-consciously consider the teaching of Delaware corpo-
rate law as central to that effort.7
I have a passionate8 belief that a very good way to teach Corpora-
tions is to structure the course around a core goal-to teach
Delaware corporate law systematically-not just bits and pieces of
it, but the entire system, much the way we approach the teaching of
constitutional law. This Essay is an elaboration of my reasoning
and strategies, organized as a presentation and discussion of the
core rationales for organizing the course in this way. The first
justification flows axiomatically from the following proposition: we
create value for many of our students, and harm none, by giving
' Thompson, supra note 1, at 444.
5 CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY&ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS (3d ed. 1999).
" This assertion is based on a comparison of the relative focus on Delaware cases and
statutes in the leading casebooks, as well as a comparison of the organizational structure and
emphases. The O'Kelley and Thompson casebook appears structurally unique in three
respects. First, except for a brief introduction of federal securities law concepts, it
systematically surveys the nature of the corporation in relation to state corporation law
before focusing in detail on issues presented by federal securities law. Second, the coverage
of state corporation law is divided so that students develop a complete understanding of the
statutory and judicial norms governing publicly traded firms before being exposed to the
unique problem illiquidity poses for closely held firms. Third, the chapters primarily
emphasizing the interface between state corporation law and the publicly traded corporation
are structured to allow a detailed and coherent study not only of the general issues and rules
of state corporation law, but also to promote a systematic study of Delaware corporation law.
Thus, chapter subpart headings contain specific references to the Delaware corporation code
section that students should read in preparation for a particular class. Additionally, each
chapter focusing on the publicly traded corporation contains the seminal Delaware cases on
all substantive points and is structured to present systematically the entire framework of
Delaware corporation law. O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 5.
Thompson, supra note 1, at 444-45.
8 The Teaching Corporate Law Conference was organized around the "passions" in the
teaching of corporate law that each participant identified.
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them an opportunity to become experts in Delaware corporate law. 9
As discussed in Part I below, I believe there are significant "market-
ing" reasons-how we present our role as teacher and the role of the
introductory Corporations course to students-for adopting this goal
or rationale.
The second justification takes as a given that one of our goals is
to give students a theoretical understanding of how corporate
lawyers create value for their clients, and that a related goal is to
begin to equip students with the substantive understanding and
skills that good corporate lawyers must have. As discussed in Part
II, I submit that training students to be experts in Delaware
corporate law provides important building blocks and opportunities
to teach the transaction cost engineering role of the value-adding
corporate lawyer. This Essay concludes in Part III with a brief
discussion of two examples of the use of Delaware corporate law in
the basic course.
I. THE "MARKETING" ROLE OF ASPIRING TO TRAIN
EXPERTS IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW
Teachers of the introductory Corporations course must deal with
three universally recognized phenomena. First, Corporations is
viewed by many students as a "bar course." Thus, while it is usually
not a prerequisite for graduation, most law students feel compelled
to take it. Second, Corporations is a "business" course. Many of the
students who reluctantly take Corporations because they feel they
must, will do so with extreme disinterest and with a certainty that
they lack the background to do well in the class. Finally, almost all
of the students in the class will have experienced a strange transfor-
mation sometime during or at the end of their first year of law
studies that makes them uninterested in preparing for, or partici-
pating in, the bulk of their classes. Instead, they save their energy
' In other words, I am asserting that we who teach Corporations should have a more
ambitious goal than simply helping students learn the general principles of corporation law,
or systematically teaching the Model Business Corporations Act (M.B.C.A.) or the law of the
state in which a particular law school is located. Whatever the value of instruction in general
principles, the M.B.C.A., or home-state law, systematic instruction in Delaware corporation
law should be a more fundamental goal of the course.
20001 931
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and passion for the courses, particularly advanced courses, in the
areas in which they hope to practice, and for extracurricular
activities, clinics, externships, and part-time employment.
There are a number of strategies for dealing with students' fear,
loathing, and disinterest in the Corporations class. I have probably
tried most of them, including giving in and treating it as a bar
course designed principally to convey basic understanding of
common law, statutory rules, and classic issues that should be
spotted by the minimally competent attorney.
My current teaching strategy, however, is to teach the basic
Corporations course as an "advanced course" with the goal of
motivating as many students as possible to become committed and
engaged. Setting as a goal that students will leave the basic course
well on their way to becoming experts in Delaware corporate law is
an essential part of my strategy. From the first day of class, I tell
my students that my goal is to increase the value of their human
capital, and that I am going to do this, in part, by giving them a
chance to become experts in, and indeed advocates for, Delaware
corporation law."° I then make a series of empirical assertions that
I ask students to challenge as we go through the course.
"0 The need for corporate lawyers wherever situated to be experts in Delaware law is
reflected in the following explanation of the extent to which Arizona lawyers should give legal
opinions regarding the corporation law of other jurisdictions:
Opinions of Arizona lawyers are customarily limited to the laws of
the State of Arizona, and a lawyer usually does not render an
opinion about the organization, existence, and good standing of a
corporation formed under the laws of a jurisdiction in which the
lawyer is not licensed to practice. In most cases, that opinion is
provided by local counsel in the state of incorporation. The Commit-
tee recognizes a general exception to this rule in the case of
corporations formed under the laws of Delaware as a result of the
common choice of Delaware as the state of incorporation. A lawyer
rendering an opinion about the status of a corporation formed under
the laws of another jurisdiction, including Delaware, should have
sufficient knowledge of the laws of that jurisdiction and conduct the
due diligence necessary to render the opinion.
State Bar of Arizona Corporate, Banking, and Business Law Section Subcommittee on Legal
Opinions, Report on Rendering Legal Opinions in Business Transactions, 727 P.L.I.-CORP. 9,
26 (1991).
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ASSERTION #1. Delaware is the jurisdiction most often
chosen for publicly traded corporations or corporations
that are likely to become publicly traded.
Empirically, I can easily show that Delaware is the overwhelm-
ingly preferred jurisdiction of current publicly traded firms." But
can I show that this apparent dominance represents current reality
as opposed to being a reflection of a past preference that no longer
exists? It could be that Delaware is the current leading state of
incorporation only because until recently it was the favored state of
incorporation for firms making or preparing to make the transition
from closely held to publicly held status, but now is being edged out
by a different state in the market for corporate charters. I assert
that this is not so, but invite and encourage students to verify my
assertion with practitioners in the business law departments of
Atlanta's leading firms.
Many students have direct or indirect connections with these
firms, and within a relatively short time reports come back to class
strongly affirming my assertion. Indeed, at least one or more
students will report that their firm almost never incorporates clients
anywhere other than Delaware.
I now, hopefully, have most students' full attention. I have
engaged the intellectual curiosity of many students who came to the
class unaware of the unique importance of the little Commonwealth
of Delaware. I have also engaged the interest of practical-minded
students who are surprised that sophisticated attorneys are
interested in the corporate law of Delaware, and, for the first time,
begin to think that this course may be something more than just a
bar course.
I then make the following additional, related empirical claims:
" See, e.g., David P. Bancroft, Some Selected Issues in Organizational Sentencing for
Environmental Offenses, 1998 SD19 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 119, 127 n. 11 (noting that "60% of Fortune
500 companies are incorporated in Delaware due to lower taxes and tough anti-takeover laws,
280,000 corporations all together"); Richard H. Doppes et al., Corporate Governance Out of
Focus: The Debate Over Classified Boards, 54 Bus. LAw. 1023, 1055 n.18 (1999) (noting that
"currently, about 60% of the Fortune 500 and 50% of firms listed on the New York Stock
Exchange are incorporated in Delaware"); Carol Vinzant, Why Do Corporations Love Delaware
So Much?, FORTUNE, Feb. 1, 1999, at 32, (noting that over half of all Fortune 500 companies
are incorporated in Delaware).
2000] 933
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" ASSERTION#2-A. When representing individuals who are
forming a business association for which corporate status
is appropriate, but which is unlikely to become apublicly
traded firm-what I call a 'ermanent close corpora-
tion"1 -Delaware is still, presumptively, the best juris-
diction in which to incorporate.
" ASSERTION #2-B. Assertion #2-A is true whether the
permanent close corporation's principal headquarters
will be in California, Georgia, Oregon, Hawaii, or any
other American state.
" ASSERTION#2-C. Assertion #2-A is true whether the attorney
representing the individuals forming the permanent close
corporation works in the business department of a large
metropolitan law firm, for a general practice firm located in a
small town, or in any other practice setting.
This is a more controversial set of assertions. First, I have not made
the empirical claim that Delaware is, in fact, the jurisdiction most
often chosen, or currently preferred, for incorporated firms that are
likely to be permanent close corporations. Instead, I have asserted
either that Delaware is the jurisdiction which should be chosen for
such firms more often than not, or that before choosing the state of
incorporation for a permanent close corporation the incorporating
attorney should always consider Delaware.
Not all teachers or practitioners of corporate law will agree with
either version of this assertion. Indeed, a majority may disagree
with both versions on the grounds that they are empirically untrue:
While Delaware may offer advantages to publicly traded firms, it
12 A permanent close corporation should not be confused with a partnership
corporation-a business enterprise that is rationally formed as a corporation, perhaps because
of advantageous tax or limited liability rules, even though the investors would have otherwise
preferred the governance rules provided by partnership form. The number of partnership
corporations currently being formed should be significantly less than the number organized
in prior decades because of the limited liability company and the limited liability partnership,
both giving closely held firms the advantages of limited liability, partnership-like governance
norms, and the unfettered choice between being taxed as a corporation or a partnership. For
a discussion of the contracting problems that underlie partnership corporations, see Charles
R.T. O'Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost
Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 246-47 (1992) [hereinafter O'Kelley, Filling Gaps].
934 [Vol. 34:929
TRANSACTION COST ENGINEERING
does not offer such advantages to most permanent close corpora-
tions. I readily acknowledge that my assertions in this regard are
not universally shared, to say the least. However, I invite students
to use this course as an opportunity to form their own judgments,
which can best be done by becoming experts in Delaware law, as
they need to be in order to represent publicly traded firms, and to
also become experts in competing corporate law systems. The need
for this is now apparent to them, for even if my strong assertions are
true, a corollary factual maxim must also be acknowledged:
Delaware law is not always the best choice for a permanent close
corporation. 13 Thus, students must engage in the comparative study
of corporate law both to know when or if Delaware law should be
chosen for a permanent close corporation, and to know which state
of incorporation to select in circumstances where Delaware is not
the appropriate choice.14
I now raise the stakes further with the following "marketing"
assertions:
ASSERTION#3-A. Delaware is the presumptive choice for
state of in corporation for any to-be-incorporated business
association, and because a significant number of lawyers
do not realize this or are not experts in Delaware corpo-
rate law, students who do realize this and who are
13 Clearly Delaware is the state of incorporation chosen by a significant number of closely
held corporations. See Dennis S. Karjala, An Analysis of Close Corporation Legislation in the
United States, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 663, 671 n.30 (1989) (stating that Delaware hosts not only
large public companies but also thousands of close corporations whose true "home" is
elsewhere). Still, the majority of lawyers and academics probably believe that the state in
which a closely held corporation maintains its principal business headquarters is,
presumptively, the appropriate state of incorporation. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS: CASESAND MATERIALS 98 (6th ed. 1988) ("A corporation with
only a few owners... will almost invariably incorporate locally, that is, where it has its
principal place of business."); Cyril Moscow, Michigan orDelaware Incorporation, 42 WAYNE
S. L. REV. 1897, 1947 (1996) (maintaining that "[flor the largest businesses headquartered in
Michigan, the overwhelming choice for state of incorporation has been Delaware .... For
closely held Michigan businesses, it is almost always preferable to incorporate in Michigan
to avoid the additional costs and litigation exposure of incorporating elsewhere"); Harry J.
Haynsworth, Special Problems of Closely Held Corporations, 1991 C688 A.L.I.-A-B.A. 1, 55
C'Except in unusual circumstances, a corporation should be incorporated in the state where
it will conduct the major portion of its business.").
14 Of course, comparative study ofcorporate law is also necessary with respect to publicly
traded firms.
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GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:929
experts in Delaware corporate law will have a competi-
tive advantage in the marketplace as they practice
corporate law.
ASSERTION #3-B. Incorporating in Delaware is a value-
adding choice for a significant number of business
associations.
Now I have explained the ultimate reward flowing to students
who become experts in Delaware law, assuming that all of my above
assertions are true. I have asserted that students can increase the
value of their human capital by becoming experts in Delaware
law-that they will be able to compete more successfully in the
market because of their expertise in Delaware corporate law. 5
Further, I have asserted that the reason this knowledge will create
value for them is that it will create value for their clients. I have
asserted that the choice of state of incorporation matters,1 6 and more
often than not the choice of Delaware will add value for the
incorporated firm. 7
What I have initially set out for my students are increasingly
broad empirical assertions-that to be successful corporate lawyers,
.or at least to be more successful corporate lawyers, they must be
masters of Delaware corporate law. Hopefully, I now have their
attention as we move through the study of corporation law, with a
"5 Again, I am making the implicit assertion that differences in the quality of attorneys'
services will be discernible in the marketplace in a manner that will increase the attorney's
return on her human capital. While it is possible that clients cannot directly measure or
discern the differences in the quality of attorneys' work-even if such differences have effects,
positive and negative, on transaction value-it may be that such differences can be measured
by peers and communicated to the market via differences in professional reputation.
16 I am making an implicit assertion that the state of incorporation matters-that
attorneys can create value for firms they represent, at least in some cases, by selecting the
optimal state of incorporation. The converse of this proposition would be that attorneys can
decrease the potential value of a firm by selecting a less-than-optimal state of incorporation.
I make this assertion explicitly when I talk about the role of the attorney as transaction cost
engineer.
1 The reasons for Delaware's dominance in corporate law are commonly described as
including the "network benefits emanating from Delaware's status as the leading incorpora-
tion jurisdiction, Delaware's proficient judiciary, and Delaware's unique commitment to
corporate needs." Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1908 (1998) [hereinafter Kamar, Regulatory
Competition]. For a handy list of citations to the literature concerning the reasons for
Delaware's competitive advantage over other jurisdictions, see id. at 1923-28 nn.59-76.
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primary emphasis on Delaware cases and the Delaware General
Corporation Law. But I have also set the stage for another
focus-the comparative study of business associations and the role
of corporate lawyers as transaction cost engineers.
II. THE LAWYER AS TRANSACTION COST ENGINEER
One of my central missions in the introductory Corporations class
is to ensure that each student has a basic theoretical understanding
of how transactional lawyers create value for their clients in
organizing and advising jointly owned business associations. To
accomplish this goal, I introduce the central principles developed by
scholars in the field of transaction cost economics. 8 I, and others,
have written about the application of these principles as lawyers
and lawmakers carry out their respective roles in the governance of
corporations and other business associations. 9 For the basic course,
s The field of transaction cost economics can be described as an ongoing project dedicated
to working out the insights of Ronald H. Coase, most of which are set out in his two seminal
works, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937), and The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). Modernly, the most influential contributors to the development of
transaction cost economics have been Oliver Williamson and Armen Alchian. See OLIVERE.
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL
CONTRACTING (1985) (using transaction cost economics to analyze economic institutions in
book dedicated to, inter alia, Ronald H. Coase); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)
(discussing notion of corporation as originating from contractually structured team); Armen
A. Alchian & Susan Woodward, The Firm is Dead; Long Live the Firm: A Review of Oliver
E. Williamson's The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, 26 J. ECON. LIT. 65 (1988)
(summarizing Williamson's contributions to analysis of firm and providing analytical review
of transaction cost theory and its implications).
"9 See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law,
85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (proposing mediating hierarchy model of corporations); D. Bruce
Johnson, The Quas:-rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise: A Transaction Cost Theory, 44
EMORY L.J. 1277 (1995) (discussing new valuation hypothesis within transaction cost
economics); Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on the Theory of
Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213 (1993) (analyzing revolution in corporate law scholarship
that originated with Coase's article); Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1145 (1998) (examining property rights theory through focus on comparison of United
States, Japan, and Korea); Curtis J. Milhaupt, A Relational Theory of Japanese Corporate
Governance" Contract, Culture, and the Rule of Law, 37 HARV. INT'LL.J. 3 (1996) (examining
and explaining Japanese corporation through relational theory); O'Kelley, Filling Gaps,
supra note 12, at 216 (discussing gap-filling role of efficiency-minded courts and why
contractual gaps are explainable under transaction-cost based theory); Charles R. O'Kelley,
Opting In and Out of Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures: Refining the So-Called
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however, I do not seek to explore the current empirical and theoreti-
cal debates about transaction cost economics. Instead, I hammer
home the following basic points.
First, I want to tie my focus on Delaware corporate law to a
central tenet of transaction cost economics: transactional or
organizational form does matter. The value of a particular business
transaction or venture can be affected positively or negatively by the
contractual choices made at the formation of the venture."0 Second,
I want my students to see that it is the role of a corporate lawyer to
make these crucial organizational choices. If these decisions are to
be made in a value-adding way, the corporate planner must
understand the "comparative costs of planning, adapting, and
monitoring task completion under alternative governance struc-
tures."21 This requires a sophisticated understanding of not only
substantive business association law, but also the fundamental
tensions present in any business organization and the characteris-
tics and needs of the particular client.
The insights of transaction cost economics identify the economic
and behavioral factors that explain why productive activities are
most efficiently organized in a particular way. There are three key
concepts: bounded rationality, opportunism, and team-specific
investment.
"Bounded rationality" describes the nature of investors' cognitive
ability. While investors intend to act rationally, there are limits on
their cognitive abilities to process accurately all available informa-
tion about a potential investment decision involving transactions
that will continue into the future and, often, for an indefinite period
of time.22 "Opportunism" is self-interest seeking coupled with guile:
Coasean Contract Theory, 70 WASH. U.L.Q. 353 (1992) (taking issue with Johnston's proposed
revisions to Coasean contract theory) [hereinafter O'Kelley, Opting In].
o 'The underlying viewpoint that informs the comparative study of issues of economic
organization is this: Transaction costs are economized by assigning transactions (which differ
in their attributes) to governance structures (the adaptive capacities and associated costs of
which differ) in a discriminating way." WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 18.
21 Id. at 2.
2 Bounded rationality is the cognitive assumption on which transaction cost
economics relies.... Confronted with the realities of bounded rationality,
the cost of planning, adapting, and monitoring transactions need expressly
to be considered. Which governance structures are more efficacious for
which types of transactions? Ceteris paribus, modes that make large
938 [Vol. 34:929
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exploiting informational or positional advantages to extract an
unfair share of the gains from joint or team production.2" "Team-
specific investment" is the value of a particular investment that is
attributable to a team production activity. Put another way, it is
the portion of the value of a particular team member's investment
that would disappear if such team member were forced to shift her
capital to its next most valuable use.24
Bounded rationality and lack of complete information about the
future combine to create the central problem that faces all investors
in a joint endeavor-how to preserve the ability of the investors,
both individually and collectively, to adapt to changed circum-
stances without creating undue risk that adaptive mechanisms will
be used opportunistically.25 The answer for simple transactions of
limited duration is to negotiate a fully contingent contract that
specifies ex ante how the contractual relationship will respond upon
the occurrence of every possible contingency.26 This contractual
response is not efficient for business endeavors involving significant
team-specific investment in a venture of long-term duration.
Bounded rationality makes it difficult or impossible to presentiate"
the future to the required degree. As a result, the sum of the ex ante
demands against cognitive competence are relatively disfavored.
Id. at 45-46.
2 [G]enerally opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure
ofinforma-don, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise,
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or contrived
conditions of information asymmetry, which vastly complicate problems
of economic organization.
Id. at 47-48.
24 This insight should be credited to both Williamson and Alchian. Alchian and
Woodward put it this way: "If a resource can leave a team without cost or loss of its value,
Williamson would say it is independent or is not team-specific, or is'redeployable."' Alchian
& Woodward, supra note 18, at 68.
O'Kelley, Opting In, supra note 19, at 354-56.
See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REv. 854, 862-64 (1978)
(discussing classical contract law and discrete transactions) [hereinafter Macneil, Contracts];
Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contract, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691, 738 (1974) (charting
extreme transaction and extreme relational poles noting that at transactional extreme "only
the practically unplannable (of which there is little) [is] left unplanned").
, 'Presentiation" is the essence of attempting to write a fully contingent contract-to
"presentiate" is to bring the future to the present. Macneil, Contracts, supra note 26, at 863
& n.25.
20001 939
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:929
transaction costs28 incurred in drafting a highly particularized and
individualized contract, and the expost transaction costs 29 incurred
in attempting to negotiate a satisfactory adjustment to the contract
when it subsequently proves inadequate, generally will be substan-
tially greater than the benefits from such approach. Instead, the
value of a jointly owned business venture will often be increased if
investors operate pursuant to a governance mechanism or structure
for their joint endeavor that leaves the consequences of many
contingencies unspecified. The preferred structure will provide
rules and procedures that determine how both the team and team
members are able to adapt to future contingencies when they arise.30
This is where the experienced corporate lawyer steps in.31 As a
transaction cost engineer she must create the optimal governance
structure for the prospective venturers whom she represents. 2 In
28 Ex ante transaction costs are "the costs of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding an
agreement." WILLIAMSON, supra note 18, at 20.
' Expost transaction costs "include (1) the maladaption costs incurred when transactions
drift out of alignment... (2) the haggling costs incurred if bilateral efforts are made to correct
ex post misalignments, (3) the setup and running costs associated with the governance
structures (often not the courts) to which disputes are referred, and (4) the bonding costs of
effecting secure commitments." Id. at 21.
o 'The organizational imperative that emerges in such circumstances is this: Organize
transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality while simultaneously safeguarding
them against the hazards of opportunism" Id. 32.
"1 For a thorough summary of the various ways in which efficient corporate lawyers
create value for their entrepreneurial clients, see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin,
Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1 (1995).
' The following excerpt from Professor Ronald Gilson's path-breaking article explains
how corporate lawyers, as transaction cost engineers, create value for their clients.
I suggest that the tie between legal skills and transaction value is
the business lawyer's ability to create a transactional structure
which reduces transaction costs and therefore results in more
accurate asset pricing. Put in terms of capital asset pricing theory,
the business lawyer acts to constrain the extent to which conditions
in the real world deviate from the theoretical assumptions of capital
asset pricing. My hypothesis about what business lawyers really
do-their potential to create value-is simply this: Lawyers function
as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient mechanisms which
bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory's hypothetical
world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting
transactions in this world. Value is created when the transactional
structure designed by the business lawyer allows the parties to act,
for that transaction, as if the assumptions on which capital asset
pricing theory is based were accurate.
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
940
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carrying out this planning role, the sophisticated corporate lawyer
searches for the governance structure that best economizes on
anticipated ex ante and expost transaction costs.
33
With this basic background in place, I spend much of the
Corporations course elaborating on the relationship of corporation
law, and particularly Delaware corporation law, to the corporate
lawyer's effort to provide the optimal governance structure for each
of the business associations that she represents. The following are
the essential premises that I expect all of my students to under-
stand.
PREMISE #1. The corporate lawyer as transaction
cost engineer can increase the value of a prospec-
tive business association by selecting for it the
optimal type of business organization: sole propri-
etorship, partnership, Limited Liability Company
(LLC), limited partnership, or corporation.34
PREMISE #2. If corporation form is selected, the
corporate lawyer as transaction cost engineer can
increase the value of the prospective incorporated
business by choosing the optimal standard form
governance structure3 5-- the body of legislative and
YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1982).
' The sophisticated corporate lawyer's task involves the application of knowledge and
judgment in circumstances where limits on the lawyer's rationality and knowledge are both
key variables. The problem, which we seek to prepare our students to solve, is formidable.
"A complicating factor in all this is that the ex ante and ex post costs of contract are
interdependent. Put differently, they must be addressed simultaneously rather than
sequentially. Also, costs of both types are often difficult to quantify." WILLIAMSON, supra
note 18, at 21-22.
' See O'Kelley, Filling Gaps, supra note 12, at 216, 226-33,239-42 (discussing features
and advantages of various forms of organization).
' I use the term "standard form governance structure," rather than the more inclusive
term "standard form contract," because one of the central reasons investors adopt corporate
form is to avoid use of traditional contracts and resort to judicial enforcement thereof as the
principal mechanism for adapting to changed circumstances as they arise. See Macneil,
Contracts, supra note 26, at 885 (stating that governance needs of ongoing relations "have led
to the spinoff of many subject areas from the classical, and later the neoclassical, contract law
system, e.g., much of corporate law and collective bargaining").
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judicial rules that will best economize on the sum
of ex ante and expost transaction costs.
3 6
PREMISE #3. The corporate planner as transaction
cost engineer can increase the value of the organi-
zation form chosen by knowing when and how to
tailor the standard form governance structure
chosen. As a corollary to this premise, the corpo-
rate lawyer will minimize ex ante transaction costs
by choosing the standard form governance struc-
ture that requires the least ex ante tailoring.
37
PREMISE#4. The corporate planner as transaction
cost engineer can increase the value of the incorpo-
rated business by effectively advising the board of
directors on an ongoing basis concerning directors'
fiduciary obligations, and concerning the extent,
nature, and limits on their discretion. As a
corollary to this rule, the corporate planner can
minimize ex post transaction costs that will be
incurred as the corporation makes post-incorpora-
tion adaptive decisions by selecting the state of
incorporation that makes the most credible prom-
ise to maintain efficient standard form rules. An
important part of this promise is the state's assur-
ance that it will update its legislative rules and
judicial precedents in a timely and helpful fashion
so as to minimize the ex post transaction costs
It is common to refer to state corporation law as providing a "standard form contract."
See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 864 (1997)
(stating that "corporate statutes and decisions amount to a standard-form contractvoluntarily
adopted-perhaps with modifications-by the corporation's various constituencies"); Lynda
J. Oswald, Shareholders v. Stakeholders: Evaluating Corporate Constituency Statutes Under
the Takings Clause, 24 J. CORP. L. 1, 15-16 (1998) (stating that "the corporation is a
combination of various contractual relationships, with the state's primary role being the
creation and provision of a standard form contrac).
37 O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 162. For a detailed examination of a
transaction cost approach to tailoring the standard form governance structure in a closely
held corporation setting, see O'Kelley, Filling Gaps, supra note 12, at 216, 242-53.
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associated with ongoing governance of the incorpo-
rated firm."8
III. TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS THAT DELAWARE CORPORATION
LAw IS PRESUMPTIVELY A VALUE-ADDING CHOICE
I have now laid out the theoretical framework that explains the
corporate lawyer's role as transaction cost engineer, and the
relationship of that role to state corporation law. Additionally, as
set out in Part I, I have asserted that Delaware is the presumptively
optimal standard form governance structure. My entire Corpora-
tions course constitutes a testing of that hypothesis. We do this by
working through the various substantive and procedural issues that
constitute the study of corporations, and, where appropriate, by
studying where and how Delaware law differs from that of other
jurisdictions. And we do this by focusing on the basic governance
problems that arise in a business association, first concentrating on
the publicly traded firm, and then considering the markedly
different considerations faced by permanent close
corporations-firms that are not, and do not expect to become,
publicly traded. I would need a book to explain all of the ways in
which we test the hypothesis in the basic course. So in my remain-
ing space, I will provide two illustrations of how I use Delaware
corporate law in this pervasive, foundational way, each of which
plays a role in telling one of the many stories that make up my
class-the unique Delaware approach to the resolution of midstream
power struggles between shareholders and managers.
*38 See ROBERTAROMANO, THE GENIUS OFAMERICAN CORPORATELAW 32-37 (1993) (listing
legal regime that reduces costs of doing business and guarantee on desirability of state's code
as primary concerns of firms); Kamar, Regulatory Competition, supra note 17, at 1908, 1923-
36 (discussing Delaware's competitive advantages); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners:
HowDoes Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLAL. REV. 1009,1009 (1997) (using case law
to study corporate norms).
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A. SCHNELL V. CHRIS-CRAFTINDUSTRIESAND THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
LEGAL RIGHTS AND EQUITY
In all United States jurisdictions, the basic allocation of power
and responsibility between shareholders and directors entrusts the
management of the corporation's business and affairs to the
directors.3 9 The primary ownership power assigned to the share-
holders is the election of the directors, normally by plurality vote at
the annual meeting of shareholders.4" Under normal circumstances,
a corporation holds an annual meeting as scheduled by the board in
the exercise of its management power, subject to any scheduling
rules contained in the corporation's bylaws. So long as there is
harmony between the managers and the shareholders, the annual
meeting will be held at a time reasonably contemplated by the
shareholders given the corporation's bylaws and past practices, and
the current directors' nominees-usually themselves-will be
reelected to a new one-year term.4'
To introduce students to both the corporate form and the unique
Delaware standard form governance structure, it is interesting early
in the course to explore the relative rights and powers of managers
and shareholders when there is disharmony-when a subset of the
shareholders wishes to change the corporation's policies by electing
a new team of directors. An excellent case to introduce this issue is
Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries.42
Schnell arose from the conflict between the directors of Chris-
Craft and a dissident shareholders' group that planned to conduct
a proxy contest to oust the current managers. The bylaws set the
39 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) (stating that "[tihe business and affairs of
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction
of a board of directors").
40 O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 6, at 156-57, 174-76.
41 Id. at 177-78.
42 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971). Schnell is still considered the seminal case regarding when
equity will trump law. See, e.g., Chadwick M. Cornell, Reits and Upreits: Pushing the
Corporate Law Envelope, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1565, 1597-98 (1997) (discussing subsequent uses
in light of Schnell); Dale A. Oesterle & Alan R. Palmiter, Judicial Schizophrenia in
Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 IOWA L. REV. 485, 528-41 (1994) (showing extensive analysis
and application of Schnell doctrine); William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the




next annual shareholders' meeting for January 11, 1972. The
directors, however, met on October 18, 1971, and amended the
bylaws to advance the meeting date to December 8, 1971.
The dissident shareholders, having relied on the meeting date set
in the bylaws, were not ready to commence a proxy contest on the
accelerated schedule. Accordingly, they petitioned the Delaware
Court of Chancery to enjoin the holding of the meeting earlier than
previously set in the bylaws. Despite the defendant's assertion that
they were acting for legitimate corporate purposes unrelated to the
struggle for control, the Court of Chancery found that the directors
changed the meeting date to frustrate the dissident shareholders'
efforts to mount an effective proxy contest.43 Despite this finding,
the Court of Chancery refused to grant injunctive relief, reasoning
that the directors had simply exercised powers granted to them both
by the Delaware Corporation Code and Chris-Craft's bylaws. 4
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, using the following
rationale:
[M]anagement has attempted to utilize the corpo-
rate machinery and the Delaware Law for the
purpose of perpetuating itself in office; and, to that
end, for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate
efforts of dissident stockholders in the exercise of
their rights to undertake a proxy contest against
management. These are inequitable purposes,
contrary to established principles of corporate
democracy.45
43 "I am satisfied, however, in a situation in which present management has
disingenuously resisted the production of a list of its stockholders to
plaintiffs or their confederates and has otherwise turned a deaf ear to
plaintiffs' demands about a change in management designed to lift
defendant from its presentbusiness doldrums, management has seized on
a relatively new section of the Delaware Corporation Law for the purpose
of cutting down on the amount of time which would otherwise have been
available to plaintiffs and others for the waging of a proxy battle."
Schnell, 285 A.2d at 434 (quoting Court of Chancery).
" Id. at 438-39.
45 Id. at 439.
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I ask students, how can the Delaware law be efficient if it allows
directors to change the annual meeting date under any circum-
stances? Soon we are exploring the default rules of the Delaware
Corporation Code. Section 211(b) provides that the annual meeting
of shareholders shall be held "on a date and at a time designated by
or in the manner provided in the bylaws."46 Section 109(a) specifies
as a default rule that the shareholders have exclusive power to
amend the bylaws, but that they may give the directors concurrent
power to amend the bylaws via a provision in the certificate of
incorporation.47
From consideration of the relevant Delaware statutory provi-
sions, students will correctly surmise that the Chris-Craft certificate
of incorporation contained a provision granting directors the power
to amend the bylaws. Further, after examining Delaware Code
sections 102, 241, and 242, the students will realize that either
Chris-Craft's original founders decided to so empower the directors,
or the shareholders have consented to such provision via a post-
incorporation amendment to the certificate of incorporation.
In the ensuing discussion, students see that the statutory scheme
protects the shareholders from any possibility of directors changing
the bylaws to manipulate the meeting date, unless the founders or
shareholders have created this possibility by granting bylaw-
amending power to the directors. Why did the Chris-Craft founders
or shareholders create this power? Presumably they created it
because it is more efficient to allow the directors, as part of their
ordinary management of a corporation, to adapt the bylaws to
changed circumstances as needed, than it is to require that the
shareholders participate in approving such changes.4"
Why then should a Delaware court step in and second-guess the
directors' use of the very power that the shareholders have either
granted or otherwise accepted? We can inject at this point some
consideration of the teachings of transaction cost economics. A
better drafted grant of authority to directors might have limited
46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991).
" 'The fact that such power has been so conferred upon the directors... shall not divest
the stockholders ... of the power, nor limit their power to adopt, amend or repeal bylaws."
Id. § 109(a).
48 See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
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their meeting-setting or bylaw-amending power to circumstances
not involving elections, or to require shareholder concurrence in
such circumstances, or otherwise to lessen the likelihood of the
directors using their discretion to achieve selfish as opposed to
corporate goals. Why were the bylaws not structured in this way?
Is it possible that the bylaws are the product of bounded
rationality49-the failure of the planners to adequately
"presentiate '5 the future? The grant of substantial discretion to
Chris-Craft directors, however, was not absolute. The planners
knew that if directors used their discretionary powers opportunisti-
cally,51 the corporation or its shareholders might be entitled to
equitable relief. In other words, the planners' decision not to draft
fully contingent provisions to eliminate possible opportunism by the
directors may have been value-enhancing. The sum of increased ex
ante drafting costs and the predicted costs of negotiating around the
maladaptations likely to result from a detailed set of bylaws crafted
to constrain director opportunism would exceed the predicted costs
flowing from constraining directors via expost judicial imposition of
equitable discretion instead of via explicit contractual limitations.
Thus, our consideration of how the Court of Chancery should
have decided this case, and of whether the Delaware Supreme Court
is wise to reverse, focuses on the effect this case will have on future
users of the corporate form in Delaware. Arguably, users of the
corporate form will perceive that overall transaction costs are
economized by a system in which Delaware's Court of Chancery will
occasionally engage in judicial second-guessing of directors' clear
abuse of their bylaw-amending power; assured that the Court of
Chancery will protect fundamental shareholder governance rights,
shareholders will continue granting directors the concurrent power
to amend the corporation's bylaws.52
4 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
o See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
51 See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing opportunism).
2 I want students to see the link between judicial decisionmaking and ex ante planning.
Can the planner expect that judges involved in future litigation between shareholders and
managers will make decisions that are intended to ensure that transaction costs are
economized? Will the judges involved in future litigation appreciate the incentive effects their
decisions will have on future users of corporate form? One of the major advantages of
Delaware as a state of incorporation is the judiciary's keen awareness of the need to provide
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In considering the fairness and efficiency of the Delaware
approach, I want students to compare it with the provisions of the
Model Business Corporation Act (M.B.C.A.), which give directors the
power to amend the bylaws unless such power is taken away in the
articles of incorporation.53 This seemingly innocuous difference
represents a profound philosophical difference between Delaware
law and M.B.C.A.-based statutes regarding who should be presumed
to have the power to change the bylaws-the shareholders who are
the firm's residual claimants, or the directors?54
Students now see the first of many examples of Delaware law
providing greater statutory protection for shareholders than do
competing jurisdictions. But they also see the first of many
examples of the value created by Delaware's constantly updated
body of judicial precedents. I provide students with a brief look at
subsequent Delaware cases in which shareholders have asked the
Court of Chancery to grant equitable protection from directors' use
of their management power.55 I want students to see how useful
these cases are to the corporate lawyer in his role as ongoing advisor
to the corporation. They provide a rich set of stories of acceptable
and unacceptable use of directors' management power.56 No other
jurisdiction provides a similarly comprehensive or constantly
renewed and updated body of precedents.
B. THE ROLE OF SHAREHOLDER CONSENT ACTIONS
After the lessons learned from Schnell, I ask students to consider
how the standard form corporate governance structure should deal
with the following problem. Shortly after the annual shareholders
predictability and certainty for planners and users of corporate form.
53 See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 10.20 (1994) (providing for amendment by board of
diversity as shareholders).
4 This is a good opportunity to consider other governance rules that state legislatures
could consider. For example, would it be more efficient to provide as an immutable rule that
shareholders have exclusive power to amend the bylaws? Or should immutable and exclusive
authority apply only to amending the bylaws with respect to the date, time, and location of
the annual meeting? No statute provides such protection for shareholders.
' Stahl v. Apple Bancorp., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990); Blasius Ind. v. Atlas Corp., 564
A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988); Aprahamian v. HBO, 531 A.2d 1204 (Del. Ch. 1987).
' For a rich account of Delaware's use of stories to communicate the rules of the game,
see Rock, supra note 38.
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meeting of Techno Corporation, the shareholders learn that
Techno's chief executive officer and several board members are
being investigated for possible serious violations of federal technol-
ogy transfer restrictions. Suppose a majority of the shareholders
would like to remove the current directors from office immediately,
rather than allow them to continue in office for nearly a year. What
options are available to the shareholders? To answer this simple
hypothetical, students must explore the statutory provisions that
govern the election and removal of directors, and the calling of
annual and special meetings of the shareholders.
In Delaware, as in all United States jurisdictions, the normal or
default rule provides that directors are elected at the annual
meeting of shareholders for terms that run until the next annual
meeting." It is the responsibility of the corporation's managers to
call the annual meeting.5" If the managers fail to do so within thirty
days of the scheduled date, or within thirteen months after the last
held annual meeting, whichever is later, then any shareholder may
petition for mandatory injunctive relief, and it can be expected that
the Court of Chancery will summarily order that the meeting be
held. 59
As students assess the statutory rules governing annual meetings
in the context of the Techno hypothetical, they realize that this
mechanism will not work to the advantage of the majority share-
holders. There is no likelihood that the current managers will call
an annual meeting any sooner than legally required. Thus, if the
shareholders' only removal option is use of the annual-meeting
mechanism, then the majority shareholders will be forced to put up
with the current managers for at least another year.
We then consider the possibility of earlier removal of the
directors via a special shareholders' meeting. The default rule in
Delaware allows removal of one or more directors, with or without
cause, by simple majority vote of shareholders." The obvious venue
for a shareholder vote to remove the directors would be a specially
5 Delaware Code title 8, sections 211(b) and 141(b) combine to give us this rule.
The power to call the annual meeting flows from Delaware Code title 8, section 141(a),
and the directors' general supervisory authority. Responsibility flows from authority.
59 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 211(c) (1991).
60 Id. § 141(k).
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called meeting of the shareholders. In Delaware, a special meeting
of the shareholders "may be called by the board of directors or by
such person or persons as may be authorized by the certificate of
incorporation or the bylaws.'
Considering this framework, we can see a shareholder, even a
majority shareholder, has no statutory power to call a special
meeting of shareholders. Unless Techno's certificate of incorpora-
tion or bylaws contain a provision granting such power, the majority
shareholders are again without power to replace the directors before
the next annual meeting.
A comparison of Delaware law and the M.B.C.A. is instructive at
this point. Under the M.B.C.A. rule, the holders of at least ten
percent of a corporation's voting shares are entitled to demand that
a special meeting of the shareholders be held.62 The M.B.C.A. rule
would empower Techno's dissident shareholders to demand a special
meeting for the purpose of removing and replacing the shareholders.
Many students will assume that this provision is superior to
Delaware's approach in that it better protects the interests of
majority shareholders by enabling them to effect an immediate
change in control, rather than waiting for the next annual meeting
of shareholders.
I first challenge this conclusion by asking students what will
happen if the directors refuse to call a special meeting demanded by
the holders of at least ten percent of the corporation's shares. At
this early point in the semester, students are still startled to realize
that the shareholders must look to the directors to call the meeting.
Shareholders simply have no management power to act even to the
limited extent of calling the meeting. Therefore, if the directors
refuse the shareholders' demand, the shareholders will be forced to
seek mandatory injunctive relief. Under the M.B.C.A., a petition for
such relief is in order if "notice of the special meeting was not given
within 30 days after the date the demand was delivered to the
corporation's secretary... ,,6" And, when notice of a special meeting
is given, such notice must specify a time and date for the meeting
61 Id. § 211(d).




that is "no fewer than 10 nor more than 60 days before the meeting
date."64 So, without violating its legal obligations, the current board
of directors may wait thirty days after receipt of a proper demand
before giving notice of that meeting, which can be scheduled for as
much as sixty days after the notice date. Thus, under the M.B.C.A.
framework, the majority shareholders cannot hope to effect a
replacement of the current directors via a specially called sharehold-
ers' meeting for at least ninety days.
It may still appear that the M.B.C.A. approach is at least
somewhat more protective of majority shareholder rights than is the
Delaware framework. I now ask students to consider the impact of
Delaware Code section 228, which in pertinent part provides:
[A]ny action required... to be taken ... or any
action which may be taken at any annual or
special meeting of... stockholders, may be taken
without a meeting, without prior notice and with-
out a vote, if a consent or consents in writing,
setting forth the action so taken, shall be signed by
the holders of outstanding stock having not less
than the minimum number of votes that would be
necessary to authorize or take such action at a
meeting [at which all shareholders were present]
shall be delivered to the corporation.65
I next ask students to rethink their initial view that the M.B.C.A.
framework is more efficacious. Viewed from the perspective of
disenchanted majority shareholders, Delaware Code section 228 is
a far superior device for effecting a change of control than is reliance
on the ability to call a special shareholders' meeting. Additionally,
we can now question whether the M.B.C.A. default rule empowering
holders of ten percent of the voting shares to call a special meeting
is a value-adding rule as compared to the Delaware rule giving no
meeting-calling rights to shareholders, but empowering a majority
of shareholders to act without a meeting by written consent. It can
" Id. § 7.05(a).65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228(a).
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be argued that the Delaware approach makes an efficient distinction
between the rights that should be given to an already formed
majority group of shareholders (the right to act immediately and
without need for a meeting) and the rights that should be given to
minority shareholders (the right to an annual opportunity to
participate in a democratic dialogue with other shareholders). In
contrast, the M.B.C.A. approach treats minority shareholders and
coalesced majority shareholding blocks identically, allowing both
types of shareholders to call a special meeting via a demand joined
in by holders of ten percent of the voting power, but denying
majority shareholders an effective device for causing an immediate
change in the makeup of the board of directors.
IV. CONCLUSION
The foregoing provides a brief look at why and how I build my
introductory Corporations course around Delaware corporate law.
The discussion in Part III is replicated day after day as we move
from a basic introduction to the statutory norms that define the
relative rights and duties of shareholders and managers, to a
detailed look at the role of shareholder litigation and fiduciary duty,
and, finally, to a comparison of the rules governing publicly traded
corporations, and the numerous alternative approaches to the
problem of the non-publicly traded corporation. By the end of the
course, I am able to certify that most of my students are well on the
way to becoming experts in Delaware corporate law and competent
transaction cost engineers. For those who wish to improve their
mastery, I offer advanced courses in Mergers and Acquisitions,
Corporate Governance, and Corporate Law Appellate Litigation.
These courses, too, are designed to enable students to increase their
appreciation of the lawyer's role as transaction cost engineer and of
the value added by Delaware corporate law. At the very least, I am
confident that this approach provides students with a coherent,
comprehensive understanding of the basic principles of business
association law. I am hopeful, however, that for many of my
students, this approach will provide a significant, if only viscerally
measurable, increase in the value of their human capital as
prospective business planners, litigators, or entrepreneurs.
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